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Resource constraints and wireless nature of communication render the securing of
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) challenging. Ad hoc deployment of sensors make key
pre distribution schemes (KPSs) more suitable for establishing security associations between resource constrained sensors. Specifically, probabilistic key pre distribution schemes
(PKPSs) which mandate very low computational complexity, are good choices for securing WSNs.
In this thesis we examine the suitability of PKPSs for sensor networks and propose
several improvements to PKPSs for their use in WSNs. The specific contributions of this
thesis are four-fold:
• Strategies to improve trade-offs between connectivity and collusion resistance.
• Enumeration of the need for authentication, and strategies to improve the strength
of authentication.
• Exploiting imbalances between costs of different resources (computation, storage)
• Taking advantage of external storage resources to improve security of WSNs.

DEDICATION
To my Parents.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Mahalingam Ramkumar, my advisor, for the support and guidance that he provided during my Masters program. My special
acknowledgements to my committee members, Dr Rayford Vaughn and Dr Eric Hansen.
I take this opportunity to heartfully thank all my friends for their constant encouragement throughout my study at Mississippi State University.
On a personal note, I would like to thank my parents and family for their support and
patience.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

LIST OF SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND NOMENCLATURE . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1 Problem description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Motivation and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1
2
3

II. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2.1 Security in Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.1 Constraints of Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.2 Security Requirements in Sensor Networks . . . .
2.1.3 Key Distribution Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.3.1 Characteristics of KPSs . . . . . . . . .
2.1.4 Physical and Logical Connectivity . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Classification of Key Distribution Schemes . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Scalable and non-Scalable KPS . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.2 Deterministic KPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.2.1 IOS schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.2.2 Bloms KPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.3 Probabilistic KPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.3.1 Subset Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . .
2.2.3.2 Matrix Key Distribution Scheme . . . . .
2.2.3.3 Basic Random Key Distribution Scheme
2.2.3.4 q-Composite Random KPS . . . . . . . .
iv

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

7
7
8
9
10
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
15
16
18

CHAPTER

Page
2.2.3.5 Random Pairwise keys scheme . . . .
2.2.3.6 Leighton and Micali KPS (LM-KPS)
2.2.3.7 RPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.3.8 HARPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.4 Hybrid KPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.4.1 Multiple Basic KDS (MBK) . . . . .
2.2.4.2 Hashed MBK(HMBK) . . . . . . . .
2.2.5 Multipath Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

18
20
20
21
22
23
24
24

III. PROBABILISTIC KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

3.1 Advantages of PKPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Tradeoff between Connectivity and Resiliency . . . . . .
3.2.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2 q-composite KPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.3 HARPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.4 Advantages of HARPS over q-composite schemes

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

26
29
30
31
33
35

IV. ID-BASED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

4.1 Key Allocation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.1 Non-Independent Key Allocation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.2 Independent Key Allocation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.2.1 ID-based Key Distribution Schemes . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 ID-based Vs non ID-based Key Allocation Strategies . . . . . . . . .
4.2.1 Privacy and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Need for Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Strengths of Authentication and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Improving Resistance to Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 Multiple Authentications for Improving Resistance to Active attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37
38
39
39
39
40
41
43
45

V. OPTIMAL CHOICE OF KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Parallel LM-KPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Reducing key storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.1 Storage in Parallel LM-KPS . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 Key storage in RPS and HARPS . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Comparison of parallel LM-KPS with HARPS and RPS
v

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

46

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

CHAPTER

Page

VI. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

Page

3.1 Connectivity Vs Resiliency for k = 256 and n = 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

3.2 Comparison of Resiliency in HARPS, q-composite schemes (q = 1, 2, 3) for
k = 128, pc = 0.5, 0.75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

3.3 Comparison of Resiliency in HARPS, q-composite schemes (q = 1, 2, 3) for
k = 256, pc = 0.5, 0.75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

3.4 Comparison of Resiliency in HARPS, q-composite schemes (q = 1, 2, 3) for
k = 512, pc = 0.5, 0.75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

5.1 Resiliency of parallel LM-KPS when m = 8 and RPS, HARPS when m = 16,
for pnc = 0.001, ks = 1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

5.2 Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.001, ks =
1024 and m = 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3 Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.001, ks =
1024 and m = 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.4 Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.01, ks =
1024 and m = 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.5 Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.01, ks =
1024 and m = 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

vii

LIST OF SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND NOMENCLATURE

KDC Key Distribution center
KPS Key Predistribution scheme
PKPS Probabilistic Key Predistribution schemes
node and sensor are used interchangeably
k Key ring size in each sensor
P Key pool size of Key distribution center
q Key pool set of the KDC
n no of Attackers
pe Probability of eavsdropping
pa Probability of active attacks
p(n) Probability that n attackers compromise a link
pc Probability that two nodes can establish pairwise secret, connectiivty
h() One way hash function
F () Public function

viii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are expected to be useful for a wide range of application scenarios ranging from battle field monitoring to monitoring of environmental
conditions. The use of WSNs in many hostile environments, whether in the form of hostile
attackers or hostile environmental conditions, calls for security solutions that can mitigate
the ill-effects of such attacks.
An essential part of any security solution is a key distribution scheme that facilitates
desired security features for the interactions between wireless sensors. Practical solutions
should take into account various factors such as scale of deployment, resource constraints
and the lack of a priori knowledge about the topology of the network.

1.1 Problem description
Public key cryptography is a well known gold-standard for securing interactions between network components. Unfortunately constraints unique to WSNs render the use
of public key cryptography impractical due to their high computational requirements and
bandwidth overheads required for exchanging signed certificates.
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Well known authentication schemes like Kerberos [29] are also ill-suited for many
WSN applications as catering for a trusted on-line server may not be feasible. Further
compromise of the on-line server can result in complete compromise of the network.
Key pre-distribution schemes (KPS) in which the sensors are pre-loaded with secrets
before deployment are seen as more viable alternatives for securing WSNs. KPSs in which
each sensor is pre-loaded with unique pairwise secrets to communicate with every other
node in the network, are non scalable solutions, which however are not susceptible to collusions. Deterministic scalable KPSs which use complex finite-field operations to compute
the pairwise secrets mandate high computational complexity, especially if large collusion
resistance is desired.

1.2 Motivation and Scope
Probabilistic KPSs (PKPS) are seen increasingly as more viable alternatives for securing WSNs due to their low computational complexity (compared to deterministic KPSs)
and graceful degradation of security. While several researchers have investigated the use
of PKPSs for WSNs, the plethora of reasons which makes PKPSs well suited for WSNs
have not merited a thorough investigation. As a result existing work in the literature does
very little to take full advantage of PKPSs.
The primary hypothesis of the thesis is that several improvements are possible to
PKPSs to significantly improve their appeal for WSN applications. To support this hy-
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pothesis this thesis presents four significant improvements to PKPSs in the context of
WSNs. The specific contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• It is well known that optimal choice of parameters for PKPSs involve trade-offs
between collusion resistance and connectivity. Some strategies to improve such
trade-offs are proposed.
• Most of the current work in the literature seek efficient strategies to improve the
privacy of interactions between sensors, while disregarding the need for authentication. The thesis highlights the need for authentication and analyzes issues specific to
PKPSs that render secure authentication more challenging than privacy. Strategies
to improve the strength of authentication are proposed.
• While all resources may be constrained, storage is perhaps less expensive than other
resources (like computation and bandwidth), especially in scenarios where there is
a need to prolong battery life. This thesis investigates some PKPSs that can take
advantage of this resource without any increase in more expensive resources.
• In many practical deployments of WSNs, sensors will need to interact with basestations (which are also part of the WSN) before the network can begin its intended
operations. In such scenarios it may be possible to make use of storage resources
of the base-station to improve the strength of security associations between the sensors. The thesis investigates the suitability of different PKPSs for this purpose, and
proposes modifications to PKPSs to take advantage of storage resources of the basestation (in scenarios where it is feasible).

1.3 Organization
Chapter 2 provides an overview of security in sensors networks and describes various
key distribution schemes in the literature. Chapter 3 describes various advantages of probabilistic KPS, many of which have been overlooked in current literature. Chapter 3 also
includes the first contribution of this thesis - improving trade-offs between connectivity
and resilience. Chapter 4 examines the need for ID based key distribution schemes and
strategies to improve resistance to active attacks. Chapter 5 investigates PKPSs that can
take advantage of the ever-decreasing cost of storage resources. Chapter 5 also examines
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some strategies to take advantage of external storage resources. Conclusions are offered
in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Technological progress in low cost and low power communication devices has opened
up many interesting applications. One such family of applications is wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consisting of large number of low cost sensors which form an ad hoc multihop network. Sensors are typically small low powered devices with sensing, processing,
storage and (typically wireless) communication capabilities. A typical example of a sensor is the Berkeley MICA mote (sensor node) [14] that uses 4MHz Atmel ATmega 128L
processor, 128 Kb of on-board flash memory for program storage, 512 Kb of memory to
hold data and a maximum transmission range of 100ft. Wec mote, dot mote, rene mote,
and dust mote are some other examples of sensors. Because of small size, low cost and
ease of deployment, sensors have wide range of applications where they are deployed in
very large numbers. Some of the applications of WSNs include:
• Habitat monitoring for monitoring plants and animals in field conditions [1].
• Structural monitoring to detect damages in ships aircrafts bridges etc [20].
• Environmental monitoring to gather data required for weather forecasts, pollution
monitoring, early-warning of earthquakes etc.
• Battlefield monitoring, where WSNs are used to track enemy tanks, movements etc.
Example scenario: In a typical application scenario, battery powered sensors may be
air dropped over an “area of interest” (the region to be monitored). The sensors typically
5
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relay their observations to a base station, which are also deployed alongside the sensors,
over multiple-hops. The primary need for multi-hop relaying of data is to reduce the
transmission power requirement of each sensor, and consequently prolong their battery
life. In most application scenarios it may not be possible to recharge the sensor batteries.
The low cost of sensors make it acceptable to consider sensors as expendable devices once
their batteries run out of energy.
The base-stations are typically equipped with satellite communication capability to
relay the sensor data to a remote data processing center. Before the actual operation,
the sensors will be required to self configure themselves to establish routes and discover
topology of the network. It is also necessary for each sensor to determine their physical
coordinates, without which the measurements may be meaningless.
The sensors are then required to send the collected data to the base station at regular
intervals using multiple hops through the pre-determined routes. In many applications, the
sensors may also be required to process data to remove redundancies to lower bandwidth
requirements (with the intent of prolonging battery life).
The nature of applications and constraints unique to sensors make WSNs vulnerable
to many attacks. This chapter gives an overview of security issues in WSNs, necessary
characteristics of security solutions and some of the security strategies proposed in the
literature. While the capability for establishing security associations is just one component
of any security solution, it is the main focus of this thesis.
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2.1 Security in Sensor Networks
Privacy, authentication, integrity and availability are the general security requirements
of any network. Securing WSNs is especially challenging due to the limitations on the
capabilities and the cost of sensors.

2.1.1 Constraints of Sensor Networks
Some of the characteristics and constraints unique to WSN deployments are as follows:
Ad hoc deployment: In many applications sensors are deployed in an ad hoc manner.
There will be no prior topology information available to determine the security parameters.
As a result, the security mechanisms should be such that the nodes should be able to agree
upon keys for secure communication (say between neighboring nodes) after deployment.
Limited resources: Sensors are small devices which are typically battery powered.
The limited energy resources of sensors make the use of complex and computationally
intensive security mechanisms impractical.
Unattended operation: Sensors may be deployed in hostile environments like battle
fields and other remote places where the sensors are often unattended. There are also
susceptible to physical attacks from attackers striving to gather unauthorized information
or intending to reduce the utility of such networks.
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Dynamic nature of network: The size of the network may change during the life time
of the network due to addition of new nodes or failure of nodes. New nodes may be added
into the network as the energy resources of some nodes are depleted.

2.1.2 Security Requirements in Sensor Networks
While many constraints, some unique to WSNs exist, the security requirements of
WSNs are not very different from the requirements of any network.
Privacy: The information flow between the sensors, sensors and base station should
be secure. If not, the attacker can eavesdrop on the network to get sensitive information.
Privacy can be achieved by encrypting the information between the nodes [8]. The cryptographic mechanisms used should be efficient considering the capabilities of the sensors.
Authentication: Authentication of sensors is required to verify that the source and the
integrity of the data received [28] from sensors. Sensors should be able to authenticate
themselves with other sensors and base station [26, 11]. Without authentication, deliberately misleading data can be injected into the network thereby diminishing the value of the
information gathered from the network.
In addition, integrity and availability of the network are important requirements. Integrity is necessary to ensure that the messages are not altered by intercepting them. Availability should guarantee that failure of few sensors does not affect the network as a whole
i.e., the network should be fault tolerant [8]. The security schemes should support different
network sizes and also should be tolerant to dynamic network changes.
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2.1.3 Key Distribution Schemes
Two communicating nodes need to agree upon a key in order to communicate securely.
Strategies that rely on the existence of a trusted server, where a trusted server sets up a key
between nodes (in a Kerberos-like fashion), are not generally suitable for sensor networks.
This is true even while most WSNs include more capable base-stations, as compromise of
unprotected base-stations can result in complete compromise of the WSN. In other words,
it is always judicious to avoid a single point of failure.
Asymmetric cryptography is the most suitable solution in most of the real world networks. Public key schemes are resilient against node capture, as the attacker cannot get
information about secrets assigned to other nodes by capturing a node. Public key schemes
also scale very well [9]. Unfortunately asymmetric schemes are computationally much
more expensive compared to symmetric schemes. As an example, to encrypt a 1024-bit
block RSA consumes approximately 42mJ on a Dragonball processor, while AES algorithm consumes 0.104mJ [5]. More importantly mandating the use of public key cryptography can substantially increase the cost of sensors. Unless sensors have very low cost,
the entire concept of WSNs may not be as appealing.
Key pre-distribution schemes (KPS) involve initializing the sensors with the keys before deployment. The sensors exchange information after the deployment and agree upon
a key for communication. Key distribution schemes should provide that necessary security
requirements i.e., confidentiality, authentication and integrity.
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2.1.3.1 Characteristics of KPSs
Considering the resource constraints of sensors forming WSNs some of the necessary
characteristics of KPSs are as follows:
Efficiency: The KPSs should be efficient in terms of computation, communication and
storage. The cryptographic primitives should be computationally inexpensive. If key predistribution schemes involve exchanging of some information before establishing a secure
link, such overheads should be minimized. Also, the number of keys to be stored in a
sensor should consider the storage constraints.
Scalability: Ideally, KPSs should support large network sizes, while also taking advantage of smaller network sizes whenever possible. Changes in the network should not alter
the working of the schemes [26].
Connectivity: After the deployment, the KPSs should ensure that a node can communicate with other nodes in the network in one or more hops. The network should be
connected in terms of communication links established. Otherwise, the information from
the network will be complete.
Resiliency to eavesdropping attacks: The nodes in the sensor are susceptible to physical attacks. An attacker can capture the sensors to get critical information like keys, routing
information [9] etc. Using the information from the captured nodes, attackers may be able
to eavesdrop on other communication links, or carry out active attacks. One possible metric for the resiliency of a KPS may be the fraction of links that can be compromised using
the secrets compromised by the attacker.
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Resiliency to node injection: An attacker may also be able to use the compromised
secrets to employ fabricated sensors that can inject false information [9]. KPSs should
offer a high degree of resilience to such attacks.

2.1.4 Physical and Logical Connectivity
The sensors may be spread over large two dimensional areas in the real world. A
network is physically connected if every node in a network can communicate with every
other node in one or more hops. The transmission range and number of nodes per unit area
determine the physical connectivity of the network. Even though sensors are within the
transmission range of each other, they can communicate only if they share a secret (can
establish a secure channel).
In [6] sensor networks are modeled using geometric random graphs. A random graph
G(n, p) is a graph with n nodes, where p is the probability that a link exists between
two nodes. A graph G is said to be k-connected if there exists k different vertices such
that removal of the k vertices disconnects the graph [3]. For a network with uniform
random distribution of n sensors over an area A, the node density is σ = n/A. Two
main characteristics of multihop network, namely 1) minimum node degree and 2) kconnectivity are explored in [6]. If p is the probability that no node in the network is
isolated, the minimum radio range, r0 , required is ,
r0 ≥ [−ln(1 − p1/N )/σπ]1/2

(2.1)
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According to Penrose et al [17], for large values of n, starting with points with no
edges, if we keep adding edges with increasing length, the resulting graph becomes kconnected (with a high probability) if the minimum node degree dm in ≥ k. The probability that a graph is k − connected is,

Pr (G is k-connected) ≈ Pr (dmin ≥ k) = (1 −

X

2

((σπ r02 )N /N!).eσπr0 )N

(2.2)

2.2 Classification of Key Distribution Schemes
Key distribution schemes can be classified based on scalability and key allocation.

2.2.1 Scalable and non-Scalable KPS
KPSs can be broadly classified as scalable and non-scalable. The basic symmetric key pre
distribution scheme is an example of a non scalable KPS. In this scheme, for a network
size N, each node is loaded with N − 1 keys, each key for establishing a link with every
other node in the network. The basic KPS is good in terms of collusion resistance as the
n captured nodes do not reveal information about communication links involving nodes
(other than the captured nodes). This scheme requires a total storage of O(N) which is
very high for large network sizes. Even if memory is not an issue because of cheap storage
resources, this scheme is impractical. Adding any node to the network implies that all the
nodes in the network should be re-keyed, i.e., resizing of networks requires many messages
to be broadcast.

13
Scalable KPS can support virtually unlimited network sizes, but at the price of resistance to collusion. For a storage constraint of k = O(n), while non-scalable KPSs can
only support network sizes of O(N), scalable KPS can only resist collusions of n nodes.

2.2.2 Deterministic KPS
The deterministic key pre distribution schemes use deterministic process to design key
pools and key chains.

2.2.2.1 IOS schemes
ID based one way function schemes (IOS)[12] use regular graphs to establish pair wise
keys. The edges of the graph are decomposed into star-like subgraphs. A node receives
a secret key Ku and hashed keys h(Kv ||ID(u)) if it is contained in a star like subgraph
centered at v. Nodes u and v can communicate using the key h(Kv ||ID(u)). For a regular
graph of an even degree r, each node can be the center of one subgraph and a leaf of r/2
subgraphs.
In the IOS scheme the attacker cannot compromise the link between any two uncompromised nodes. However, the scheme does not support large network sizes. Multiple
ID based one way schemes [12] increase the scalability of ID based one way function
schemes but weakens the resiliency of the network. Each vertex u of G corresponds to l
sensor nodes, say u1 , · · · , ul , of the network. Every node u receives a key Ku . If a vertex
u is contained in a star-like subgraph centered at a vertex v in G, each sensor node ui
receives h(Kv ||ID(ui)). The number of keys stored in a node is k = r/2 + 1.
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2.2.2.2 Bloms KPS
Two different KPS, using MDS codes and polynomial functions have been proposed
in [25]. In the polynomial based KPS, for a n−secure scheme, the KDC chooses a polynomial
f (x, y) =

n X
n
X

aij xi y j

(2.3)

i=0 j=0

Every node is assigned a unique public ID. A node A with public ID A receives n + 1
secrets given by gA (x) = f (x, A). Two nodes A and B can calculate the pairwise secret
KAB = KBA = f (A, B) = f (B, A) = gA (B) = gB (A) independently. n + 1 nodes
can combine together to reveal all the secrets used in the system. Thus Blom’s scheme is
secure for less than or equal to (n + 1)/2 attackers. Blom’s scheme requires about k ≈ 2n
keys in each node to be n-secure.

2.2.3 Probabilistic KPS
In probabilistic key distribution schemes (PKPS), random or pseudo random strategies
are used to assign keys to each node. Many probabilistic schemes were proposed in the
literature like the basic random key distribution scheme [14], q-composite random key
distribution scheme, random pre-loaded subsets (RPS), hashed RPS (HARPS) etc. The
choice of ratio of key ring size to key pool size and key allocation strategies are the main
factors that influence the performance of PKPSs. PKPS have several advantages in WSNs,
which are examined later in the thesis.
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2.2.3.1 Subset Allocation Schemes
In subset allocation schemes, the KDC assigns each node A with a subset SA from the
key pool. Any two nodes A, B can communicate using the common keys, i.e., SA ∩ SB .
Dyer et al [16] show the existence of key distribution schemes that require O(log N)
keys per node using some extensions of the work in [21]. Also, the ideal schemes should
not have any bad triples i.e., for any two subsets SA , SB , there should not be a subset SR
such that SA ∩ SA ⊆ SR . By generating the subsets randomly, [16] show that there exists
schemes which require ⌈13 lg n⌉ keys in total. Instead of giving each node a set of k keys
each with probability p, each node is given a random subset of size t where the value of t
is chosen such that the probability of bad triple is minimized. Dyer et al. also determine
the lower and upper bounds on the subset size k for schemes which are n − secure. The
schemes can be tested only for small network sizes as the complexity of verifying the
absence of bad-triples is O(N 3 ).

2.2.3.2 Matrix Key Distribution Scheme
In the schemes proposed in [15], each pair of nodes share a subset of keys. In a
network of size N, where N = m2 , each node is assigned a position nij in the address
map and each of N keys is assigned a position kij in the key map. Each node nij is assigned
keys which are in same row or column as the node, i.e., Kij = {kab |a = i or b = j} . Two
nodes communicate using the common keys between them as it is guaranteed that any two
nodes have at least two nodes in common. The schemes require a total of N keys and
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√

2 N keys per node. If two communicating nodes are in same row or column, any node in
the same row or column also shares the same set of keys with the communicating nodes.
A single node can thus compromise all the communication links between nodes which are
in same row or column.
In the multi-line version of matrix scheme each node nij is assigned set of t lines passing through i, j instead of 2 lines in the basic scheme. Key set of each node is represented
by t linear equations. Any pair of nodes in the system can calculate the common keys by
solving t(t − 1) linear equations. This requires tN keys per nodes. There exist a number
of groups of colluding nodes of size t which can compromise a link. In the multi-map version, t key maps are generated and each node nij is assigned keys as in the basic scheme
for each key map. At least t colluding nodes are necessary to compromise a link.

2.2.3.3 Basic Random Key Distribution Scheme
The key distribution scheme proposed in [14] is a random scheme which consists of
three phases, namely key pre-distribution phase, key discovery phase and path key establishment phase. In key pre-distribution phase, a key pool of P secrets and key identifiers
are generated. Each sensor is loaded with k keys randomly selected from the key pool. In
the key discovery phase, each node discovers the neighbors with which it shares keys as
follows:
• Each node can broadcast the key identifiers so that neighbors can establish a secured
link using the shared keys.
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• The nodes can also encrypt a challenge with the keys and then broadcast the encrypted keys. The nodes which can decrypt the challenge can then establish a secure
link.

In, path key establishment phase, shared key is established between the pair of nodes
within communication range which do not share keys at the end of shared key discovery
phase. These nodes are connected by more than one link. The key distribution schemes
should ensure that there are enough keys after the shared key discovery phase to establish
links in the path discovery phase.
The parameters P, k should be chosen such that at the end of the shared key discovery
phase, the whole network is connected. Consider a random graph, G(n, p) where n is the
number of nodes and p is the probability that a link exists between two nodes. According
to Erdos and Renyi, for any monotone property, there exists a value p such that the property transits from likely false to true. Accordingly Eschenauer and Gligor calculate the
necessary degree d such that the graph is connected with very high probability c as
d=(

n−1
)(ln n − ln (− ln (c)))
n

(2.4)

If n′ is the average number of nodes in the communication range of each node, the probability p is given by
p=

d
n′

(2.5)

Depending on the n′ , P, k are chosen to satisfy the required connectivity. The shared
key can be present in the key ring of any other node. A captured node gives information
of k keys and an adversary an compromise any other link with probability k/P .
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2.2.3.4 q-Composite Random KPS
Three key establishment schemes using the framework of pre-distributing a random
set of keys to each node are proposed in [10]. In the q-composite random pre-distribution
scheme the nodes should share at least q, (q > 1) keys to establish a secure link between
them unlike the basic scheme which requires only one key. The initialization phase is
similar to the basic scheme. In the key discovery phase each node broad casts all the key
identifiers to identify neighbors with which it shares at least q keys. The communication
link is established using the hash of all the shared keys. If number of keys shared is q′, the
pairwise secret K is given by,
K = h(K1 ||K2 || · · · ||Kq′ )

(2.6)

The q-composite scheme increases the resilience of the network as the number of keys
to be shared for link establishment. Increase in over lap of keys means that the key pool
size should be reduced; otherwise the probability that two nodes have a communication
link is reduced. If the key pool size is reduced then the attacker can compromise more
communication links by capturing fewer nodes. q-composite key distribution schemes
perform well for small scale attacks: as the number of attackers increase the performance
degrades.

2.2.3.5 Random Pairwise keys scheme
The random-pairwise keys scheme [10] provides node to node authentication, i.e., each
node can verify the identity of the node to which it is communicating. Random pair wise
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scheme is a modification to the basic scheme where most of the N − 1 keys are unused.
Given the probability c that the entire network is connected, according to Erdos and Renyi,
the probability pc that the any two nodes are connected is calculated. If the network size
is N, each node is required to store N ∗ pc keys instead of N − 1 keys. Node to node
authentication can be achieved if each node which holds a key Ki , also stores the node
identity of the other node which holds Ki . In the initialization phase of random pair wise
scheme, a total of N = k/pc node identities are generated. Each node identity is then
matched with k other randomly selected node identities and a pair wise key is generated
for key pair if nodes. The key along with the node identity which knows the key is stored in
the node. In the key setup phase, each node broadcasts its node ID. The node searches its
key ring for the node IDs to know if it shares a pair wise key with the node IDs. According
to [10] random pair wise scheme has the following properties:
• Resilience against node capture
• Node to node authentication
• Distribution Node Revocation
• Resistance to node replication and generation
• Comparable scalability
The maximum network size supported in random pairwise scheme is not as large as the
q-composite schemes.
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2.2.3.6 Leighton and Micali KPS (LM-KPS)
In LM scheme [31], KDC assigns each node A two keys KA , KA and pairwise key
KAB for every pair A, B. KA , KA′ are computed using master keys K, K ′ , KA = h(K, A), KA′ =
h(K ′ , A). If node A needs to communicate with node B, A gets KAB = h(KA , B) ⊕
h(KB , B) and the authentication identifier Au(A, B) = h(KA′ , h(KB , A)) from the KDC.
Node A then selects a random session key S and encrypts it using h(KB , A) obtained from
KAB ⊕ h(KA , B) = h(KB , A)

(2.7)

Node B can decrypt the value using h(KB , A). LM-KPS provides authentication and
resistance against colluding nodes. But, each node requires a total of N − 1 values.
2.2.3.7 RPS
RPS [19] facilitates n-secure r-conference communication, where r nodes can compute a session key for communication and n implies that the session key cannot be obtained
by any n colluding nodes. The pre-loaded subsets of keys are determined by the node ID,
the advantages of which are discussed later in the thesis. RPS combines ideas from [14]
and [10]. It is defined by the parameters Key pool P and key Ring k. A public one way
function F () determines the public key of each node.
F (IDA ) = IA1 · · · IAk

(2.8)
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The nodes exchange their node identifiers to find the keys shared between the nodes using
public function F (). The session key is given by the hash of all the shared keys. The
session key of nodes A and B is given by

KAB = h(KAB1 || · · · KABm )

(2.9)

where KAB1 , KAB2 , · · · KABm are the keys common between nodes A and B.
Appropriate k/P value should be chosen for the required performance of the scheme
against n attackers. As n value increases, k/P should be decreased for the same resilience.
As n varies k can be changed linearly to maintain same resiliency against eavesdropping
attacks.

2.2.3.8 HARPS
Hashed Random Pre-loaded Subsets (HARPS) [24] key distribution scheme is the
generalization of RPS [19] and key distribution schemes proposed in [31]. HARPS is defined by three parameters (P, k, L) where P is the size of key pool with keys K1 , · · · , KP
, L is the maximum hash depth, k is the key ring size. Two public functions h(), a cryptographic has (one-way) function and F() a public key generation function are also used.
The trusted authority (TA) has an indexed set of P secrets. Each node is pre-loaded with
a hashed subset of k keys. The set of keys pre-loaded is the function of the node ID.
For a node A, F (IDA ) = (IA1 , dA1), (IA2 , dA2 ), · · · (IAk , dAk ) where IA1 , IA2 , · · · IAk are
the key identifiers assigned to the node A and dA1 , dA2 , · · · dAk are the hash depths of the
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respective keys. Each key IAk is hashed dAk times and loaded into the sensor. LM-KPS
[31] and RPS are special cases of HARPS. RPS is HARPS with L=0(keys are not hashed
before pre loading).
The nodes which need to communicate with each other, exchange their node IDs. The
keys assigned to each node can be derived from the node ID. The intersection of the keys
is calculated and is hashed forward to reach the maximum hash depth among the nodes.
All the shared keys hashed to the maximum depth are then concatenated to obtain session
key. Each node can calculate the session key independent of the other nodes. For example,
if two nodes A and B need to establish a session key, the common keys between A and B,
{I1 , I2 , · · · , Im } = {IA1 , IA2 , · · · , IAk } ∩ {IB1 , IB2 , · · · , IBk }

(2.10)

are calculated. The session key is calculated as follows:
KId11 ⊕ KId22 ⊕ · · · ⊕ KIdmm

(2.11)

where dm = max(dAm , dBm ).

2.2.4 Hybrid KPS
Hybrid designs combine deterministic design techniques along with probabilistic approaches to support large network sizes. Hybrid Symmetric Design and Hybrid GQ Design
are two hybrid key pre distribution schemes proposed in [27, 13].
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2.2.4.1 Multiple Basic KDS (MBK)
MBK [18] consists of multiple deployments of basic KDS, where each node is given
N −1 secrets to communicate with every other node. Consider m deployments where each
deployment of the basic scheme can support network size M, which is less compared to
the total network size. Let S1 , S2 , · · · , Sm be the key sets in m independent deployments.
Each key set Si is of size

M +1
2



. If IDA represents the ID of node A, each node is

assigned a short identifier f (IDA , i) in each of the m systems where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The
node is assigned M keys in each system, so a total of k = mM keys are assigned to each
node in total. The keys assigned to node A is given by,

KA = K(f (IDA , i), j), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ M

(2.12)

Any two nodes A, B can communicate by computing all F (IDA , i), F (IDB , i), 1 ≤
i ≤ m. Thus each node can determine the secrets independently. The link key can then be
updated to any random value or can be function of the shared keys. Though in the basic
scheme, the captured nodes cannot reveal information of other nodes in the system, there
is a problem of collusion in MBK. This is because, there is a probability that same short
identifier is assigned to more than one node. So attackers can collude together to get more
information.
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2.2.4.2 Hashed MBK(HMBK)
HMBK [18] combines ideas from MBK and LM-KPS [31]. HMBK is defined by 3
parameters (M, m, L) where m, M are similar as in MBK and L is the maximum hash
depth. Each node with ID IDA in assigned an identifier Ai and a hash depth ai given by
F (IDA , i), 1 ≤ i ≤ m in each of the m systems. The keys assigned to node A is given by,
KA = K ai (f (IDA , i), j), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ M

(2.13)

To compute the secret, K(Ai , Bi ), between two nodes A, B in any system i, K(Ai , Bi ) =
K d1 (Ai , Bi ), d1 = max(ai , bi ). Similarly the secrets are computed in all the m systems.

2.2.5 Multipath Strategies
The key used in the communication link in the basic key distribution scheme can be
present in the key ring of other nodes. If any of those nodes are captured then the security
link using this key is compromised. Multipath key reinforcement strategies can improve
the collusion resistance of link keys.
Multipath key reinforcement [10] uses a link key which is a combination of random
values exchanged over multiple secure links (paths containing links).Let A, B be two
nodes in the network which have a secure link after the shared key discover phase. Let
A have the knowledge of all the disjoint paths to B. If A, N1, N2, · · · Ni, B is the path
from A to B, where each of the links (A, N1), (N1, N2), · · · (Ni, B) are protected by a
link key. Let j be number of such disjoint paths. A generates j random values r1 , r2 · · · rj
and routes each random value along j different paths to B. The new link key is then
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k′ = k ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rj

(2.14)

The only way an adversary can attack is, by monitoring all the key setup traffic [10],
and by compromising the secret of at least one link in each path. The security of the
link can be increased with the number of paths. As the length of the path increases, the
probability that the adversary can monitor the traffic increases. Also, it is expensive to find
multiple disjoint paths as the path length increases. Note that while multi-path strategies
are useful for probabilistic schemes (where the probability that any specific link can be
compromised is less than 1) they provide no benefit for deterministic schemes (which fail
catastrophically) where an attacker who can compromise one link can compromise all
links.

CHAPTER III
PROBABILISTIC KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
In this chapter we investigate various advantages of PKPSs that makes them suitable
for WSNs. The tradeoffs between connectivity and resiliency, which is an important factor
to be considered in the design of PKPSs is investigated.
Among the different PKPSs discussed in Chapter 2, hashed random pre-loaded subsets
(HARPS) offers the best collusion resistance for a given storage limitation. This improvement is achieved due to the fact that HARPS takes advantage of a “virtual key-expansion”
due to repeated hashing.
Furthermore, the optimal choice of the ratio k/P can be higher for HARPS to achieve
the same probability of attacker success. The higher ratio of k/P implies better connectivity for the same collusion resistance. Alternately HARPS can offer better collusion
resistance for the same connectivity. Comparisons of the performance of HARPS and
q-composite schemes are also reported in this chapter.

3.1 Advantages of PKPS
Deterministic schemes use complex functions and are computationally expensive
compared to the PKPS. Unlike various deterministic schemes in which the network can
be compromised completely if the number of attackers n increase beyond a particular
26
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value, the security of PKPS degrades gracefully. For example, a n−secure Blom’s scheme
[25] is secure as long as number of compromised nodes is less than or equal to n. If the
number of compromised nodes is greater than n, then the network can be compromised
completely. Probabilistic KPS are based on (n, pe )-secureness, where the attacker with
n nodes can compromise any link with probability pe . PKPSs have several compelling
advantages over Blom’s KPS and also over other deterministic schemes.
For a PKPS with key ring size k and key pool P , the average number of shared secrets
is m = k 2 /P . The pairwise secret between any two nodes is derived as a one way function
of all m shared secrets. Thus PKPSs requires only m operations with block ciphers /
hash functions, which can be efficiently implemented in hardware. On the other hand,
implementation of Blom’s KPS requires evaluation of n-degree polynomials over a finite
field. Furthermore, for evaluation of any shared secret between A and B, for Bloms’
scheme both nodes have to employ all of their k secrets. For PKPSs on the other hand, the
nodes employ only m of their k secrets.
The most important advantage of PKPS is the fact that the collusion resistance n can
be increased to any extent by increasing k, without increasing m, as m = e log(1/p) is
independent of n. Thus the collusion resistance of PKPSs can be increased to any extent
without increasing the number of cryptographic operations that have to be performed, and
increasing only the storage requirements.
The practical advantage of PKPS comes from the fact that storage is the resource with
the fastest Moore’s law growth rate. The keys can be stored on an external storage en-
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crypted with a master key known only to the sensor. Even if the external storage is attacked, the attacker cannot get any information as the keys are stored in an encrypted
format. Furthermore the number of secrets to be stored by each node may not have much
of an influence on the depletion on the battery energy of sensors. However the number of
secrets that need to be fetched from storage and used, and the number of operations performed with secrets will have a more direct effect on the battery life. Thus the collusion
resistance of PKPSs can be made very high without draining battery life.
Sensors are considered trusted components of the network, as the information from
them is crucial. Sensors should be shielded from unintentional and intentional intrusions
(aimed at exposing secrets or tampering with the behavior of sensors) for reliability i.e.,
sensors should be tamper resistant. Measures to improve the tamper resistance of sensors
may not be very effective due to constraints on cost. The cost of such measures will depend
on the computational ability, and more specifically the amount of heat dissipated by the
components to be protected. Improving tamper resistance reduces the ability to dissipate
heat. Solutions that simultaneously cater for heat dissipation and shielding tend to be
expensive due to the constraints on the material that can be used for physical shielding
[30]. However, if the computational complexity inside the trust boundary is low enough to
eliminate the need for proactive heat dissipation, unconstrained and inexpensive shielding
techniques can be used.
Thus PKPSs with very low computational complexity are very well suited for sensor networks. Even while asymmetric cryptographic primitives may be well within the
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capabilities of the sensors of the future, taking into account the extra cost associated with
tamper-proofing, it may be advantageous to deliberately keep the complexity of computing
elements in sensors very low.

3.2 Tradeoff between Connectivity and Resiliency
In PKPSs the where the keys are allocated to each sensor from the key pool P using
probabilistic mechanisms, the ratio k/P determines the resiliency and connectivity of the
network. The resiliency of the network is determined by the number of links an attacker
can compromise using the information exposed from the compromised nodes, and it is
desirable to keep this value low. If k/P is increased, the probability that two nodes share
keys to establish a secure link increases, increasing the connectivity of the network. But
if the value of k/P is high, the attacker will have access to a larger fraction of keys by
capturing few nodes [23], thus reducing the resiliency. If k/P value is low, the probability
that a key is used in a link is very low thus increasing resiliency, at the same time decreasing the connectivity of the network. Obviously there exists a tradeoff between connectivity
and resiliency in terms of k/P ratio. The optimal choice of k/P is necessary to ensure
both connectivity and resiliency.
For a given network, the key ring size k may be a constraint. In such cases, key
distribution schemes which increase the resiliency of the network for a given connectivity
are good choices.
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3.2.1 Problem Statement
Consider a network with key pool P, consisting of P keys K1 , K2 , · · · , KP . The
key ring of any node, say A, is represented by KA1 , KA2 , · · · , KAk . Let pc denote the
probability that a link exists between two nodes i.e., pc denotes the logical connectivity of
the network. A link is compromised if there exists a secure link which can be compromised
by the attacker. We assume that if no secure link can be established between two nodes,
then the link between the two nodes cannot be used (or compromised). The constraints on
the network are the minimum required connectivity pc , and a maximum limit on the key
ring size k of each node. The problem now is the choice of parameters of PKPSs to meet
this requirement.
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In the rest of this chapter we analyze and evaluate the performance of HARPS and
q-composite schemes under these constraints.
Fig 3.1 shows the plot between connectivity and resiliency for q-composite random
key distribution schemes. As the connectivity increases the probability that an attacker
compromises a link increases, i.e., resiliency decreases.

3.2.2 q-composite KPS
q-composite random key distribution scheme proposed in [10] takes the idea from
basic random KPS proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [14]. To establish a communication link between two nodes, the nodes need to have at least q common keys where
q ≥ 1. Also, if two nodes share more than q keys, all the common keys are used in
computing the pairwise secret.
If k is the key ring size, the probability that a particular key is present in a node is
x = k/P

(3.1)

Consider two nodes A, B each with k keys assigned to them. For each of the k keys in A,
probability that it is not present in B is 1 − x. The probability that two nodes do not share
any key is given by (1 − x)k . The probability that they share at least one key is,
Pr{probability of sharing at least one key} = 1 − (1 − x)k

(3.2)

The probability that two nodes share i keys is given by,
 
k
× xi (1 − x)(k−i)
pi =
i

(3.3)
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The probability that two nodes share at least q > 0 keys which defines the connectivity pc
is given by
pc = 1 − {p0 + p1 + · · · + pq−1 }

(3.4)

For a given key ring size k and probability of connectivity pc , the required x = k/P if
only one key is required for connectivity is given by
x = 1 − e(log(1−p))/k

(3.5)

The attacker with secrets from n nodes can collude to compromise links in the network. In
q-composite random key distribution schemes, number of keys used in the link ,m ≥ q.To
compromise a link, each key used in the link should be present in at least one attacker. For
each key in the link, probability that the key is not present in any of the n compromised
nodes is (1 − x)n . The probability that the key is present in at least one compromised node
is 1 − (1 − x)n .
If m keys are used in the link, the probability that a link is compromised is equal to
the probability that each of the m keys is present in at least one attacker. Probability that a
link consisting of m keys is compromised is given by,
(1 − (1 − x)n )m

(3.6)

For each value of m ≥ q, the probability that the link uses m and the probability that the
m keys are present in the attackers gives the probability of link compromise.
pe =

k
X

m=q

pi × (1 − (1 − x)n )m

where pi is the probability that the link uses i keys.

(3.7)
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Comparison of Resiliency in HARPS, q-composite schemes (q = 1, 2, 3) for
k = 128, pc = 0.5, 0.75

3.2.3 HARPS
Let L denote the maximum hash depth in the HARPS scheme. To compromise a link
in HARPS, for each key identifier used in the link, the attacker should have the particular
key which is hashed less times compared to the hash value used in the link. To find the
probability that an attacker can compromise a link that uses m keys, K1 , K2 , · · · , Km :
For each key Km ,
Pr{a key used in a link is compromised} = 1 −

L
X
2l − 1
l=1

L

(1 −

l n
x)
L

(3.8)
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gives the probability that the key Km used in the link is compromised. The probability
that a link that uses m keys is compromised is
(1 −

L
X
2l − 1
l=1

L

(1 −

l n m
x) )
L

(3.9)

The probability that a link is compromised in HARPS is given by,
pe =

k
X

m=q

pi × (1 −

L
X
2l − 1
l=1

L

(1 −

l n m
x) )
L

where pi is the probability that the link shares i keys .
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(3.10)
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3.2.4 Advantages of HARPS over q-composite schemes
For k = 256 and n = 100, Fig 3.1 shows the plot between connectivity and resiliency
in HARPS and q-composite scheme (q=2). For a given key ring size constraint, as the
connectivity increases, the probability that the link is compromised increases in HARPS
and the q-composite scheme. HARPS gives better resiliency for the same required connectivity. For example, for p = 0.5, pe = 0.08 for q-composite schemes while pe = 0.06
for HARPS for n = 100.
Given the design constraint, k, of a sensor, KPSs which give improved resiliency for
the same connectivity are good choice. Fig 3.2, Fig 3.3, Fig 3.4 compare the resiliency for
HARPS and q-composite schemes for various key ring sizes, k = 128, k = 256, k = 512
and connectivity requirements, p = 0.5, 0.75. As the number of attackers increase, the
probability that a link is compromised increases, as the attacker has more secrets.
As q increases, the performance of the q-composite schemes is good only for very small
number of attackers; with the increase in number of compromised nodes, performance
degrades rapidly. HARPS performs well compared to q-composite scheme when q =
1 in all cases (for all key ring sizes and connectivity). When the number of attackers
is very small, q-composite schemes where q > 1 perform better compared to HARPS.
For large number of attackers, the performance of HARPS is better. The probability of
link compromise increases drastically in q-composite schemes as the number of attackers
increase, but this is not in the case of HARPS.
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Figure 3.4
Comparison of Resiliency in HARPS, q-composite schemes (q = 1, 2, 3) for
k = 512, pc = 0.5, 0.75

CHAPTER IV
ID-BASED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Sensor networks are susceptible to passive attacks like eavesdropping and active attacks in which the attacker can physically tamper the nodes to get secrets. Existing literature mostly ignore the need for authentication and considers only privacy of links. While
in most scenarios privacy and authentication go hand in hand, this is not necessarily true
for many PKPSs that have been proposed in the context of securing sensor networks, like
the basic probabilistic scheme in [14] and the q-composite scheme [10]. In particular, this
is a result of the specific strategy for key allocation used in such schemes.
In this chapter we investigate some key allocation strategies for PKPSs and highlight
the need for authentication to prevent active attacks. Also, proposed in this chapter are
some simple strategies to improve the strength of authentication.

4.1 Key Allocation Strategies
Key allocation strategies can be divided into two classes, independent and non-independent
allocation schemes.
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4.1.1 Non-Independent Key Allocation Strategies
In this category of key allocation schemes, the keys allocated to each node are dependent on keys allocated to other nodes. For example, a random set of keys may be assigned
to some node A first. The set of secrets assigned to a second node B will depend on the
set of secrets already assigned to A. Similarly the set of secrets assigned to a node C will
depend on the secrets assigned to both A and B earlier. Such allocation strategies can
meet some specific design criteria and thereby improve the overall efficiency. Some of the
properties that can be achieved are,
• Any two nodes should share a minimum of m′ keys. This ensures that a node can
communicate with any other node in the network. This is specifically important in
sensor networks where there is no prior deployment knowledge.
• All P secrets are assigned an equal number of times [4]
• Ensure that no node has a set of k keys such that they contain the intersection of
any two nodes [16]. For example, there should not exist any subset SC such that ,
SC ⊆ SA ∩ SB where SA , SB , SC are the subsets allocated to nodes A, B, C.
• Ensuring that no n nodes exist such that the pool created using all their secrets
contains the shared secret of any two nodes not in the pool [7]

These strategies are complex and expensive, making them feasible only for small network
size. If nodes A and B need to determine the shared indices to establish a secure channel,
the nodes A and B will first advertise the indices of the secrets they posses till they find
some or all of their shared indices. Following this both of them employ the shared keys
corresponding to the shared indices to generate their secret.
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4.1.2 Independent Key Allocation Strategies
In the “independent” allocation schemes, the set of keys allocated to a node is not a
function of the set of keys allocated to any other node. For example, the keys allocated
to each node can be randomly selected from the key pool by the KDC. In, ID based key
distribution schemes the key set allocated to each node is tied to the node ID.

4.1.2.1 ID-based Key Distribution Schemes
In ID-based schemes, a public one way function F () on the node ID is used to determine the indices of the keys assigned to any node. The indices assigned to node A with ID
IDA can be determined by a function F (IDA ) i.e., F (IDA ) = KA1 , KA2 , · · · KAk . The
function F could be a public random sequence generator which takes the node ID as the
seed. If F is public, a node can compute the key indices of any other node given the node
ID.
If two nodes A and B need to establish a secure channel in ID-based scheme, the nodes
need to compute the shared indices. The nodes need each other’s ID to compute all shared
indices.

4.2

ID-based Vs non ID-based Key Allocation Strategies
In non ID-based strategies, the nodes need to advertise their key indices to determine

the shared keys i.e., they need bandwidth intensive strategies to determine what indices
are shared by any two nodes. In ID-based schemes, the nodes need to advertise only their
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node IDs requiring less communication bandwidth compared to non-ID based schemes.
Another point to note is that, k cannot be increased in non-ID based schemes, but this can
be done in ID based schemes (and increase the resiliency).

4.2.1 Privacy and Authentication
Both ID-based and non-ID based key distribution schemes provide privacy as the
nodes encrypt the data exchanged using the shared secrets. The resistance to passive attacks (attacks against privacy), is same in both the schemes.
Again consider a scenario where nodes A, B need to establish a secure channel. In
non-ID based schemes, A, B advertise their key indices until they have one or all shared
keys. In this process, node A gains no knowledge of identity of node B. There is no way
for A to verify that the indices advertised by a node claiming to be B should correspond
to B. Only the KDC knows which indices were assigned to which nodes. Node B can
claim some identity C and advertise some random indices with some indices common
with A. Thus a node can claim any identity as long as it has some common keys with the
communicating node.
In ID-based schemes a node claiming an identity B should prove that it has secrets
that the “real” node B should share with A. This is possible if an attacker physically
compromises B. Otherwise an attacker can impersonate B for the purpose of fooling
some node A only if the attacker can discover KAB . Thus the establishment of pairwise
secret simultaneously serves as implicit authentication of the node IDs.
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One of the main advantages of ID-based scheme is authentication the need for which
is examined later in this chapter. Non ID based subset allocation schemes using random
approach are first studied in [16]. The basic random key distribution scheme in [14] and
q-composite random key distribution schemes [10] are also non-ID based random subset
allocation schemes. They do not provide implicit authentication and are suboptimal in
terms of random allocation of keys. Random allocation strategies may be sub optimal for
small network sizes, but for large network sizes the random strategy approaches complex
allocation strategies. [19, 24, 22] are ID-based extensions to PKPS providing authentication.

4.3 Need for Authentication
Node to node authentication is necessary to verify the source of the data. Authentication between base station and nodes is very important in situations like re-keying and
revocation where important information is exchanged. Consider an attacker who has exposed all secrets from say a sensor A. Using the secrets derived from the sensor A the
attacker can
1. discover shared secrets between arbitrary nodes (say secret KBC between nodes B
and C) with a probability p(1) (which could be small enough to be ignored)
2. Synthesize many nodes that can take part in the network and relay misleading data

Attackers can pool enough secrets from nodes so that synthesized nodes can be added to
the network claiming different identities. With implicit authentication of node IDs all such
synthesized nodes will be forced to assume the identity A. Thus if the network operators
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recognize the presence of multiple nodes with the same ID A, all sensors may be instructed
to ignore all messages from nodes that can authenticate themselves as A.
In scenarios where implicit authentication of node IDs is not feasible, an attacker can
synthesize any number of sensors placed all around the network which can assume arbitrary identities and relay “data” to its neighbors. Such an attacker, sending messages to
the base station employing several different identities can render the network unusable. In
many applications of sensor networks like battlefield monitoring and habitat monitoring,
the sensors collect critical data. If the data collected by each sensor is processed directly
by the base station, the base station can verify the authenticity of the data using the key
shared between the base station and the node. In such a scenario if all messages sent by
a node A are expected to be authenticated with its unique secret, all synthesized nodes
will also forced to assume the same identity. Note that while a node synthesized using the
secrets of A may claim any identity for purposes of fooling its neighbors, it cannot fool the
base station. But in many cases intermediate nodes process the data for various reasons.
The data collected by nodes in same locality may be redundant. Simple schemes to remove
data redundancy may be included in the sensors thus, improving the energy utilization. In
such cases authentication of data by base station is not possible. Node to node authentication is necessary to verify that the data is from a trusted node. Without authentication,
false nodes injected into the network can modify the data making the measurements from
the sensor network false.
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After the deployment of sensors in the application area, the sensors send link state
packets to the base station. The link state packets may contain information such as position
of each node and its neighbors. The base station uses the link state packets to construct
the topology of the network and this may be critical in processing the information. If false
nodes are injected into the network, the base station may misrepresent the topology of the
network. The base station may get link state packets with false information or link state
packets from various locations with the same node identity. The information from the
sensor may not be useful in this case also.
The attackers can inject false nodes at various points in the network. If the number of
false nodes dominates the legitimate nodes in the network, the attacker can gain control of
the network which is a very serious attack. The damage due to node injection makes the
information from the network useless in many cases.

4.3.1 Strengths of Authentication and Privacy
The privacy of the network can be attacked by eavesdropping on the communication
links. These are generally passive attacks aimed at gathering sensitive data exchanged
between sensors. To perform a passive attack on a link, the attacker should have all the
keys used in the link. If an attacker can discover the secret shared by two nodes A and B,
the attacker can
1. eavesdrop on all exchanges between A and B, and
2. authenticate herself as A for purposes of interactions with B and vice versa.
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For ID-based schemes the effort involved for an attacker to “break the privacy” of
interactions between two nodes (or carry out successful passive attacks) appears to be same
as the effort involved for circumventing authentication (or gain the ability to perform active
attacks by impersonating some node). While this is indeed true for deterministic KPSs,
this is not true (in general) for probabilistic KPSs. Note that for a n-secure deterministic
KPS, as long as the attacker has exposed all secrets from n or less nodes (say A1 · · · An ,
the attacker cannot discover any pairwise secret KXY where X, Y, 6∈ {A1 , A2 , . . . An }. For
probabilistic KPSs, the attacker can discover a fraction p of all pairwise secrets. While the
probability p that the attacker can discover a specific KAB between nodes A and B may be
small, for an attacker desiring to perform active attacks to fool say node A that the attacker
is some node X 6∈ {A1 , A2 , . . . An }, the attacker has the freedom to choose from a large
number of possible IDs. Thus if the attacker has the freedom to choose any of M IDs,
C1 · · · CM , the probability of attacker success is the probability that the attacker can find
the shared secret KACi for any 1 ≤ i ≤ M.
The probability that the attacker can determine any specific KACi is p(n). The probability that the attacker can not determine any KACi is (1 − p(n))M . The probability that
the attacker can determine at least one KACi is therefore
pa (n, M) = 1 − (1 − p(n))M ≈ Mp(n) for p(n) << 1/M

(4.1)

In general, the attacker could choose to impersonate any node except a few nodes that may
be neighbors of node A. Thus it is likely that M ≈ N, the network size.
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As a numerical example, if p(n) = 10−6 , for a network size of N = 5000 while an
attacker can succeed in eavesdropping on a specific link is p, the probability that an attacker
can impersonate some node, for purposes of fooling any node is pa = 1 − (1 − 10−6 )N =
0.049, a substantially higher probability. In other words, while p(n) = 10−6 may be
acceptable (an attacker can eavesdrop on one in a million links in the network) from the
perspective of passive attacks, it is clearly not an acceptable deterrent to active attacks.

4.3.2 Improving Resistance to Active Attacks
Several strategies are possible to improve the resistance to active attacks through impersonation. One strategy is to restrict the network size and making each node aware of
the valid node IDs. In many situations, a number IDs remain unused. For instance while a
deployment may consist of nodes with 32 bit IDs, the nodes actually deployed may have
only 5000 nodes. Thus an attacker has freedom to choose 4 billion identities. If the range
of node IDs is restricted to O to O + 4999 then resistance to impersonation attacks can
be improved. However, in many cases, assigning sequential IDs may not be feasible. One
possibility in such scenarios is
1. the use of efficient Bloom filter [2] representations, where the filter values will include IDs of all nodes deployed in the network, or
2. increase m ∝ log(1/p) (and thereby increase the storage, k ∝ nm) such that 1/p
is significantly larger than the ID-space (232 is the size of ID space if 32 bit IDs are
used, even if the actual number of deployed nodes may be smaller

Ideally, some strategy which caters for both scenarios where nodes with sequential
IDs are deployed and situations where choosing nodes with sequential IDs may not be
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possible) is required. Increasing storage k caters to both scenarios, while over provisioning
for the first scenario. But, it is good idea to use the storage resources k = nm to improve
collusion resistance n than to increase the storage just because of the size of the ID space.
The side effects of increasing m (and lowering p) is less desirable than increasing n. In
many schemes m determines the amount of computation and communication involved.
Increasing m increases the complexity involved in computations and it is always desirable
to keep m as low as possible.

4.3.3 Multiple Authentications for Improving Resistance to Active attacks
A simple strategy to reduce susceptibility to active attacks, without increasing m, is to
insist that every node authenticate itself to multiple verifiers. For instance if node B needs
to authenticate itself to node A, B should authenticate to other neighbors of A. So, if node
A requires node B to prove its authentication to b−1 nodes V1 · · · Vb−1 , the attacker should
have the ability to determine KAMi , KV1 Mi · · · KVb−1 Mi for some i to impersonate A as B.
The probability that the attacker can determine KAMi , KV1 Mi · · · KVb−1 Mi for a specific i
is p(n)b . 1 − (p(n))b is the probability that an attacker cannot claim a particular identity.
Thus the probability that the attacker can successfully perpetrate an active attack is,
p′a (n, M, b) = 1 − (1 − (p(n))b )M ≈ M(p(n))b

(4.2)

where M is the number of node identities an attacker can assume. For example for the
numerical example seen earlier (p(n) = 10−6 and M ≈ N = 5000), and b = 2, the
probability of success for the attacker is 1 − (1 − 10−10 )N ≈ 5 × 10−7 . In other words,
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if A enlists the support of another node to verify the authentication of the “node claiming
to be Mi ,” the probability of success for the attacker can be substantially reduced. As the
number of verifiers increase, the success of the attacker can be decreased.
Thus in scenarios where nodes with sequential IDs can be deployed we may settle
for b = 1 (verified only by one node) or b = 2. In scenarios where it is not possible to
efficiently convey the set of valid IDs, a larger b may be used.
Furthermore, the strategy for improving the strength of authentication can also be efficiently combined with multi-path strategies that have been proposed for increasing the
resistance to eavesdropping attacks. If the key used in the link is some function of the common keys between the nodes, there is a chance that the shared keys are present in some
set of nodes captured. In multi-path reinforcement schemes [10], the key used in the link
is updated to a random value, thus decreasing the chance of an attacker to compromise
the link by collusion. To establish a secure link between nodes A and B , updating the
link to a random value using multiple paths further increases resiliency. As an illustrative
example, consider a scenario where two nodes A and B have two common neighbors C
and D. More specifically, in such a scenario, A and B have 3 possible paths
1. A → B
2. A → C → B, and
3. A → D → B
For improving the security of the pairwise secret between A and B, A sends three random values R1 , R2 , R3 , and sends KAB (R1 ) directly to A, KAC (KAB (R2 )) to C and
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KAD (KAB (R3 )) to D. Nodes C and D relay the values they receive (KAB (R2 ) and
KAB (R3 ) respectively) to B after encrypting them with secrets KCB and KDB respectively. The final shared secret between A and B is then K = R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ R3 .
Note that knowledge of KAB alone is not sufficient for an attacker to eavesdrop on
future messages between A and B, encrypted with the key K. To determine K an attacker
should have access to
1. KAB , and
2. KAD or KDB , and
3. KAC , or KCB
Assuming that an attacker (who has exposed secrets from n nodes that does not include
A, B, C, D) can determine any shared secret with probability p. The probability that the
attacker can determine R2 is probability that attacker can access KAD or KDB which is
given by
1 − (1 − p)2

(4.3)

The probability that the attacker will succeed in discovering K is
pe = p × (1 − (1 − p)2 ) × (1 − (1 − p)2 )
= p × p(2 − p) × 2(2 − p) ≈ 4p3

(4.4)

Similarly, if m different paths are used the probability that attacker will succeed is,
pe = 2(m−1) × p(m)

(4.5)
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Consider an example where p = 10−6 and an ID space of 232 (assuming no efficient
strategy is feasible to assign IDs to N << 232 nodes in the network). If 3 different paths
are used, the probability of success of passive attacks, is pe ≈ 4 × 10−18t . The probability
of success of active attacks, is pa ≈ 4.3 × 10−9 when 3 nodes are used for verification .
ID based key allocation strategies with less communication overhead are shown to
more advantageous to WSNs compared to the non ID based schemes. This is mainly
because of the implicit authentication provided by ID based schemes, which is more challenging than the privacy. It is particularly important to increase the strength of authentication i.e., to reduce the probability of node synthesis as low as possible. Multiple authentications improve the strength of authentication with little overhead.

CHAPTER V
OPTIMAL CHOICE OF KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES FOR
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Apart from being inexpensive, storage capabilities of sensors can be increased without
affecting (expensive) battery resources. Efficient solutions should strive to take advantage
of inexpensive resources, and in the bargain also strive to reduce the dependence on more
expensive resources. Some PKPSs can take advantage of this resource to realize significant
improvements in collusion resistance.
Furthermore, even in scenarios where it may not be feasible to equip every node with
large storage, it may still be feasible for the nodes to use the base-station for storing their
secrets. All such secrets of a node A can be encrypted using a secret that only node A
has access to, and stored in the base-station. Thus compromise of the base-station will not
lead to a single point of failure, as the secrets of nodes cannot be compromised.
In the first part of this chapter we investigate some extensions to a recently proposed
PKPS that takes very good advantage of storage. We then extend the scheme to take
advantage of storage in the base-station.
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5.1 Parallel LM-KPS
This KPS consists of deployment of m LM-KPS [31] in parallel where each deployment can support only fixed network size M << N. Each node in the network is represented by an l bit identifier. Also, in each deployment a node is assigned a short identifier
of size b bits, where b ≥ log M. A public function F () is used to assign each node a short
identifier in each of the LM-KPS. IF IDA represents the ID of node A,
F (IDA , i) = ai , 1 ≤ i ≤ m

(5.1)

gives the short identifier in each LM-KPS.
For each of the m systems, KDC computes a set of public values P1 , P2 , · · · , Pm . Each
set Pi consists of

M
2



public values. Also, the KDC chooses a master key Mi for each of

the m systems . A node is assigned a secret in each of the m systems. For example the
secret assigned to node A with short identifier ai is given by
Kai = h(Mi , ai ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m

(5.2)

Each node is given a total of m(M-1) public values, (M-1) values for each system. The
public values to node A with short identifiers a1 , a2 , · · · , am is given by
Pi (ai , j) = h(Kai , j) ⊕ h(Kj , ai ) 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ M

(5.3)

If two nodes A and B need to establish a pairwise secret, each node computes all the 2m
short identifiers ai , bi using the public function F (). The secret in each of the m systems
is computed as
Si (ai , bi ) = h(Kai , bi ) ⊕ Pi (ai , bi )

(5.4)
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Node B can just compute h(Kbi , ai ) as it is equivalent to Si (ai , bi ), so it does not need a
public value(this can be used to reduce storage seen later in the thesis). The secret can also
be h(Kai , bi ), in which case B uses the public value to compute the secret. The pairwise
secret is computed using all m secrets.

5.1.1 Analysis
A key Si (ai , bi ) can be compromised if there is another node ci such that ci ∈ {ai , bi }.
This is possible in parallel LM-KPS as the short identifiers assigned to a node are node
unique. The probability of ci ∈ {ai , bi } is given by
Pr{ci ∈ {ai , bi }} = γ =

2M − 1
≈ 2/M,
M2

(5.5)

The probability that ci ∈ {ai , bi } in all m systems is very low. The probability pe (n) that
an attacker with n compromised nodes can compromise a link is calculated as follows: The
probability that none of the n compromised nodes ∈ {ai , bi } is given by ǫ(n) = (1 − γ)n .
The probability that n compromises nodes can compute the pairwise secret is given by
pe (n) = (1 − ǫ(n))m = (1 − (1 − γ)n )m
(5.6)
Using the identity, (1 − 1/x)x ≈ e−1 for large x,
2n

pe (n) ≈ (1 − e−nγ )m ≈ (1 − e− M )m

(5.7)
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5.2 Reducing key storage
After the deployment of sensors, typically many interactions between base-station and
the sensors are mandated. For example the need to determine spatial coordinates of sensors
and the need to find optimal forwarding paths for the measured information calls for this
requirement. For example, in a forest fire detection application, the physical location of a
sensor is necessary to pin point the exact source of the fire.
As the interactions between the base-station and the sensors are mandated, in any case
exchanges for this purpose can also be leveraged to communicate encrypted secrets or
public values from the base-station to the nodes. While the base-station can serve as a
trusted server schemes like Kerberos, it was pointed out earlier that such an approach
implies a single point of failure.
All PKPSs can take advantage of the interactions with the base-station storage. The
base-station can store the keys in the encrypted format, using a key known only to the
sensor. In this case, an attacker cannot get any information from the base station. In
order for the sensor to take the advantage of the base station storage, first weak authentications need to be established with the neighboring nodes using in the secrets stored in the
sensor before deployment. After this, just the keys required for exchanging secure links
with neighbors need to be fetched from the base-station. Such a strategy can improve the
storage efficiency of the sensor considerably.
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5.2.1 Storage in Parallel LM-KPS
In a LM-KPS scheme, each sensor needs only m keys to establish a security association. So, to establish a security association with v neighbors, each sensor needs to store
vm secrets, which is far less than mM. Also, vm can be still reduced to vm/2 as it is
enough if any one of the two nodes in the communication link has the public value.
In the LM-KPS scheme, we have seen that it is enough if any one of the communicating nodes has the public value. If each node is assigned only a fraction a of the public
values, the the key storage can be reduced (k = amM). But in this case, there will be a
probability that both the communicating nodes do not have the public value. In this case
only fraction of m secrets can be used to compute the pairwise secret. Also, there should
be a mechanism to determine what are the keys that can be used to compute the pairwise
secret.
In this case, two nodes can establish a pairwise secret if they have public values in at
least one of the m systems. The probability that any key Si (ai , bi ) can be used is given by
1 − (1 − a)2 = 2a − a2 . If an attacker has access to all public values, probability that it
can determine a pairwise secret is then given by,
pe (n) = (1 − (2a − a2 )ǫ(n))m = 1 − (2a − a2 )(1 − γ)n

m

2n

=≈ (1 − (2a − a2 )e− M )m
Let b =

2n
.
M

(5.8)

Then pe (n) = (1 − (2a − a2 )e−b )m . From Eq,
m=

log pe (n)
log (1 − (2a − a2 )e−b )

(5.9)
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The number of keys k = amM is thus given by,
log pe (n)
log (1 − (2a − a2 )e−b )
log pe (n)
= 2an
, M = 2n/b
b log (1 − (2a − a2 )e−b )
k = aM

(5.10)

The minimum value of k is obtained at b = log (1 + 2a − a2 ). For this value of b,
log(1/pe (n))
(log (1 + 2a − a2 ))2

(5.11)

1
log(1/pe (n))
2n
,m =
,M =
2
m
2
(1 + 2a − a )
log(1 + 2a − a )
log(1 + 2a − a2 )

(5.12)

k = 2an
pe (n), m, M values can be shown as
pe (n) =

If each node is assigned all the public values i.e., a = 1,
pe (n) =

1
log(1/pe (n))
2n
log(1/pe(n))
,m =
,M =
, k = 2n
m
2
log(2)
log(2)
(log(2))2

(5.13)

The probability that two nodes share at least one key to establish a link is give by,
pc = 1 − (1 − a)2m

(5.14)

5.2.2 Key storage in RPS and HARPS
RPS and HARPS can also take the advantage of the base station by storing only
fraction a of the required keys. Consider an RPS scheme with the constraint m = k 2 /P .
Each node stores only fraction a of the total keys, ks = ak, where ks is the key storage. If
pc represents the probability that two nodes share at least one key to establish a pairwise
secret,
pc = 1 − (1 − xs )ks , xs = ks /P

(5.15)
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Probability that a link cannot be established is given by pnc = 1 − pc = (1 − xs )ks . P value
can be obtained from the required pc or pnc i.e., P = ks /xs . Using m, P values, k and a
can be obtained.

5.3 Comparison of parallel LM-KPS with HARPS and RPS
In RPS and HARPS, the keys stored in the external base station need to be encrpyted
with the secret shared between the node and the base station so that an attack on the base
station cannot reveal any information. But this is not necessary in parallel LM-KPS as the
base station is used to store public values. Also, in parallel LM-KPS it is enough if one of
the node in the link has the public value so that base station needs to send only half of the
public values.
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Figure 5.1
Resiliency of parallel LM-KPS when m = 8 and RPS, HARPS when m = 16, for
pnc = 0.001, ks = 1024
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Figure 5.2
Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.001, ks = 1024
and m = 8

Consider a numerical example of parallel LM-KPS. If M = 1024, m = 32, then
parallel LM-KPS is (n = 355, p = 2−32 )-secure with storage k = 32768. For each
pairwise key, m = 32 symmetric cipher operations are needed. Also, the public function
F () needs only 2m = 64 operations. The value of m can be further reduced if desired by
tolerating a marginal increase in storage.
The number of symmetric cipher operations for HARPS m = 2.71 log 1/p(n) is larger
than parallel LM-KPS (for which m = 1.44 log 1/p(n)). Also, we can see that in parallel
LM-KPS, storage can be increased to increase the collusion resistance while keeping the
value m constant (and hence the computational complexity). While collusion resistance of
HARPS can also be increased by increasing the storage k, this increases the complexity of
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public function F (), which depends on k. Thus parallel LM-KPS can take better advantage
of storage.
Example: Given the constraints m, pnc , ks , the values a, k can be calculated for RPS
and a, k, M for parallel LM-KPS. For m = 16, ks = 1024, pnc = 0.001, the fraction of
keys a used in parallel LM-KPS is 0.2 whereas a = 0.656 in RPS (and HARPS). The total
keys assigned to a node in parallel-KPS is thus significantly larger than RPS (and HARPS),
but the fraction value a is less in parallel LM-KPS compared to RPS (and HARPS). Also,
for the same key storage on the sensor, the resiliency of parallel LM-KPS is substantially
higher. In this example, the number of symmetric cipher operations is same (m = 16).
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Figure 5.3
Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.001, ks = 1024
and m = 16
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For the same ks = 1024, pnc = 0.01 the plot between parallel LM-KPS for m = 8 and
RPS for m = 16 is shown in the Fig 5.1. We can see that, with less number of symmetric
cipher operations, parallel LM-KPS performs better compared to RPS and HARPS except
when the number of compromised nodes is small.
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Figure 5.4
Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.01, ks = 1024
and m = 8

Fig 5.2, and 5.3 compare parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS, show that performance
of parallel LM-KPS is lower than RPS and HARPS when number of attacker is small, but
performs better than RPS and HARPS as the number of attackers increase.
HARPS is a storage efficient KPS with good trade offs between resilience and connectivity. Though the collusion resistance of HARPS and LM-KPS can be increased by
increasing the storage, it comes at a cost of computation (F ()) in HARPS, while the com-
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plexity of F () is comparatively lower in parallel LM-KPS. Even though the total key ring
size k is much larger in parallel LM-KPS, using external storage and using mandated basestation interactions adds to the advantage of parallel LM-KPS, which makes it an optimal
choice of KPS for WSNs.
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Figure 5.5
Comparison of parallel LM-KPS, RPS and HARPS schemes for pnc = 0.01, ks = 1024
and m = 16

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Efficient KPSs with good resiliency against passive and active attacks are necessary in
WSNs. The thesis examined various advantages of PKPSs and its suitability for wireless
sensor networks. Choosing optimal parameters for PKPSs involves trade offs between
connectivity and resiliency; HARPS is shown to have improved trade offs compared to
other KPSs.
The need for ID based key allocation strategies in PKPSs, which can provide authentication in addition to privacy was emphasized. Though ID-based extensions to probabilistic
key distribution schemes provide resistance to active attacks by implicit authentication, the
resistance to active attacks is less compared to the passive attacks. This is because of the
freedom of the attacker to choose (a node to impersonate) from the large ID-space. Multiple authentication strategies were proposed to improve the resistance to active attacks.
With the efficient key storage and good trade offs, HARPS can be seen as a good choice
of KPS. With the decreasing costs of storage resources, PKPSs can trade the computational
complexity (expensive resource) with the storage resources. The thesis identified parallel
LM-KPS, as a PKPS that can take good advantage of storage. The thesis also proposed
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some extensions to the parallel LM-KPS scheme to take advantage of storage in the basestation.
Scope for further work exist in the methodology to determine the public values to
be used in the pairwise secret during the establishment of (initial) weak authentication in
parallel LM-KPS. Optimal choice of the fraction of public values to be used under different
constraints on the strength desired for the initial weak authentication is also an area that
needs further exploration.
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